Aging, creativity, inter-speciality mobility, retraining, and technical obsolescence of scientific and technical personnel - A selected bibliography

Aging, creativity, inter-speciality mobility, retraining, and technical obsolescence of scientific and engineering personnel - selected bibliograph

Stumbling blocks to entrepreneurship in low-and-moderate income communities

Community development

Bank Regulation in the United States

Bankenpolitik, Bankensystem, Geschichte, Zeitgeschichte, Vereinigte Staaten, Banking policy, Banking system, Historical perspective, Contemporary history, United States

Banking systems around the globe : do regulation and ownership affect the performance and stability?

The authors report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries. They evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability. They document substantial variation in response to these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the powers of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of banking and commerce be restricted by regulating commercial bank's ownership of non-financial firms and non-financial firms'ownership of commercial banks? Should states own commercial banks, or should those banks be privatized? They find: 1) There is no reliable statistical relationship between restrictions on commercial banks'ability to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and how well-developed the banking sector, how well-developed securities markets and non-bank financial intermediaries are, or the degree of industrial competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to argue confidently that restricting commercial banking activities benefits-or harms-the development of financial and securities markets or industrial competition. 2) There are no positive effects from mixing banking and commerce. 3) Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the securities activities of commercial banks are substantially more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries whose national regulations inhibit banks'ability to engage in securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing--and all aspects of the mutual fund business--tend to have more fragile financial systems. 4) The mixing of banking and commerce is associated with less financial stability. The evidence does not support admonitions to restrict the mixing of banking and commerce because mixing them will increase financial fragility. 5) On average, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly functioning financial systems.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research

The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database

International consultants on bank regulation, and supervision for developing countries, often base their advice on how their home country does things, for lack of information on practice in other countries. Recommendations for reform have tended to be shaped by bias rather than facts. To better inform advice about bank regulation, and supervision, and to lower the marginal cost of empirical research, the authors present, and discuss a new, and comprehensive database on the regulation, and supervisionof banks in a hundred and seven countries. The data, based on surveys sent to national bank regulatory, supervisory authorities, are now available to researchers, and policymakers around the world. The data cover such aspects of banking as entry requirements, ownership restrictions, capital requirements, activity restrictions, external auditing requirements, characteristics of deposit insurance schemes, loan classification and provisioning requirements, accounting and disclosure requirements, troubled bank resolution actions, and (uniquely) the quality of supervisory personnel, and their actions. The database permits users to learn how banks are currently regulated, and supervised, and about bank structures, and deposit insurance schemes, for a broad cross-section of countries. In addition to describing the data, the authors show how variables ay be grouped, and aggregated. They also show some simple correlations among selected variables. In a comparison paper ("Bank regulation and supervision: What works best") studying the relationship between differences in bank regulation and supervision, and bank performance and stability, they conclude that: 1) Countries with policies that promote private monitoring of banks, have better bank performance, and more stability. Countries with more generous deposit insurance schemes tend to have poorer bank performance, and more bank fragility. 2) Diversification of income streams, and loan portfolios - by not restricting bank activities - also tends to improve performance, and stability. (This works best when an active securities market exists). Countries in which banks are encouraged to diversify their portfolios, domestically and internationally, suffer fewer crisis.Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Economic Theory&Research,Insurance&Risk Mitigation

Financial Regulation And Performance: Cross-Country Evidence

This paper examines three questions. First, do countries with relatively weak government/ bureaucratic systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on activities of banks? Second, do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have poorly functioning banking systems? Third, do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have a lower probability of suffering a banking crisis? We find that the answers are as follows. Countries with weak government/ bureaucratic systems tend to impose harsher regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks. There is mixed evidence regarding the impact of regulatory restrictions on bank performance. Finally, we find that countries that restrict securities market activities tend to have more fragile banking systems.

Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?

The authors draw on their new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess different governmental approaches to bank regulation and supervision and evaluate the efficacy of different regulatory and supervisory policies. First, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to support political constituencies. Second, they assess the effect of an extensive array of regulatory and supervisory policies on the development and fragility of the banking sector. These policies include the following: Regulations on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce. Regulations on entry by domestic and foreign banks. Regulations on capital adequacy. Design features of deposit insurance systems. Supervisory power, independence, and resources; stringency of loan classification; provisioning standards; diversification guidelines; and powers to take prompt corrective action. Regulations governing information disclosure and fostering private sector monitoring of banks. Government ownership of banks. The results raise a cautionary flag with regard to reform strategies that place excessive reliance on a country's adherence to an extensive checklist of regulatory and supervisory practices that involve direct government oversight of and restrictions on banks. The findings, which are much more consistent with the grabbing-hand view of regulation than with the helping-hand view, suggest that the regulatory and supervisory practices most effective in promoting good performance and stability in the banking sector are those that force accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control.Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Insurance&Risk Mitigation

Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?

This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources, (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership. The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.

Large Synthetic Datasets for Improved Deep Learning

The objective of this work was to further advance technology in agriculture, specifically by pursuing the research direction of agricultural robotics for harvesting in greenhouses, with the specific use-case of Capsicum annuum, also known as sweet or bell pepper. Within this scope, it was previously determined ..